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Showing posts with label crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label crisis. Show all posts

26 March, 2013

Forget Cyprus, Japan Is The Real Crisis


Forget Cyprus. A much bigger story in the coming weeks and months will be in Japan, where one of the greatest economic experiments in the modern era is about to begin. A country where government debt even dwarfs those of Europe’s crisis-ridden nations, Japan will attempt to inflate its way out of a 23-year deflationary spiral.
The overwhelming consensus among the world’s economists is that quantitative easing (QE) has saved the day in the U.S. and that Japan needs to follow suit, on a larger scale. I beg to differ and suggest this policy will almost certainly lead to a hyperinflationary disaster in Japan. If that’s right, it will have serious ramifications for other countries, dragged down by an acceleration of the so-called currency wars. More broadly though, it is likely to destroy the myth pushed by today’s economists that QE is a cure-all for downtrodden economies. It isn’t and Japan will become the template to prove it.
Monster stimulus on the way
The new Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, started work on Thursday and his first day on the job disappointed investors. At a press conference, Kuroda pledged to do whatever it takes to defeat deflation and reiterated the government’s target of 2% inflation. But he provided little in the way of specifics and investors promptly bought the yen and sold stocks.
More concrete measurers will almost certainly come by the central bank meeting on April 3-4. There are good odds that they may come even earlier via an emergency meeting of the bank.
It’s widely expected that the BoJ will expand its 101 trillion yen (US$1.06 trillion) asset buying program by more than 10 million yen. Also, it will start buying Japanese government bonds with remaining maturities of up to five years by scrapping the upper limit of three years by the end of April.
The idea behind the strategy is that you create money out of thin air, use that money to buy government bonds off private institutions and others, thereby increasing money supply and possibly inflation. Also, the institutions will start lending the money out, thereby kick-starting spending and the economy. That’s the theory anyhow.
What was fascinating to watch was the verbal sparring between the outgoing and incoming BoJ governors. In Japan, where group consensus rules, this was almost an outright brawl.
Outgoing Governor Masaaki Shirakawa has never been a believer in the inflationist policies of the new government and he didn’t mince his words in his final days in office:
“Even if prices rise 2% and wages do the same, that won’t mean an improvement in people’s living standards … what we want to achieve is an increase in real economic growth…
… Past figures in Japan as well as in Europe and the U.S. show that the link between monetary base and prices has been broken.”
The latter refers to the fact that printed money in the U.S. and Europe hasn’t flowed through to economies as banks have sat on the money rather than lent it out.
And if Shirakawa wasn’t clear with the above, he was with the following:
“If there was one single measure that would have resolved the problem, just like clearing a fog, then we wouldn’t have been in this state for the past 15 years.”
The new BoJ chief, Haruhiko Kuroda, wasted little time trampling on his predecessor’s legacy. Though couched in economic jargon, his statements were clear enough: Shirakawa was part of a failed era of central banking and something new needed to be done:
“It’s very important for the BoJ to make itself responsible for the 2% [inflation] target by a certain period … We should not make excuses that it wasn’t our responsibility if we fail to achieve it.”
And:
“In the long term, the correlation between money supply and inflation is high.”
In other words, if we print enough money, inflation will come. And we’ll do whatever it takes to get the job done.
Is it the right path?
The sparring between the two central bankers isn’t just an arcane discussion. It’s part of a much larger debate about the effectiveness of stimulus policies. And it matters because Japan is the world’s third-largest economy and it’s about to pursue these policies on a grander scale.
What’s amazing is the extent to which those advocating stimulus in the slow-growth developed world now dominate public debate. Consider a recent article by Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf, entitled “The sad record of fiscal austerity”. In it, Wolf takes Europe to task for enforcing spending cuts while their economies were in dismal shape:
“By adopting [outright monetary transactions], the [European Central Bank] could have prevented the panic which drove the [credit] spreads that justified the austerity. It did not do so. Tens of millions of people are suffering unnecessary hardship. It is tragic.”
He goes on to recommend a mix of stimulus, increased public spend and structural reforms to help Europe’s plight. And he finishes with this:
“In the long run, the fiscal deficit must close. In the short run, the UK has the chance to pursue growth. It should take it. So should the US.”
The arguments of Wolf and others of his ilk can be crudely summarised by three facts, which most of them would regard as beyond dispute.
Fact 1: The U.S. recovery proves stimulus works and the recovery will happen faster if there’s more aggressive QE.
Fact 2: Europe remains in the doldrums because it’s pursued spending cuts which have failed to repair economies.
Fact 3: Japan has never tried aggressive stimulus to overcome its long-term deflation problem and it needs to follow in U.S. footsteps immediately.
Given these are “facts” beyond dispute, let me dispute them.
Fact 1: It is far too early to tell whether U.S. stimulus policies have worked. They have propped up the economy in the short-term, but whether that’s sustainable in the long run is open to question. Even in the short-term though, the recovery has been slow and unimpressive. Consider: 2012 GDP growth of 2.2% vs a post World War Two average of 3.2%, a current unemployment rate at 11.3% if you include that have dropped out of the workforce since 2008, real household incomes are still 10% below levels in 2000 and the velocity of money (M2) is the lowest in more than 50 years (indicating printed money hasn’t circulating into the real economy).
Fact 2: Europe hasn’t pursued austerity. Anyone who says it has is lying. But it makes for a nice political argument in favour of stimulus. European total debt has kept climbing, now at 390%, as the private sector hasn’t paid down any debt, while governments have increased their debt portions. No cutbacks here!
And for the curious, unlike QE, there is some historical evidence that austerity can actually work. In my neighbourhood of Asia, the financial crisis of 1997-1998 brought tremendous pain to many Asian countries, but through austerity and sweeping economic reforms, they recovered relatively quickly and in much better shape.
Fact 3: Those that claim that Japan has never pursued aggressive stimulus are talking rubbish. But again, it’s nice propaganda for Keynesian advocates. From 2001-2006, Japan embraced large-scale stimulus, with its monetary base increasing by a mammoth 36% year-on-year at its peak. During the period, the monetary base rose 82% in total. But economic growth was never revived, the currency rose rather than fell and inflation continued to decline. QE in Japan was dropped because it was seen as failing.
So the question must be asked: will the conventional wisdom advocating enormous stimulus be Japan’s saviour or its noose?
Why Japan will fail
The subtitle indicates where I stand on the matter. Given its over-indebtedness, Japan has few good options left. But the policies being pursued by Shinzo Abe will fast-forward a major debt and currency crisis. It’s a matter of when, not if.
Government debt to GDP in Japan is now 245%, far higher than any other country. Total debt to GDP is 500%. Government expenditure to government revenue is a staggering 2000%. Meanwhile interest costs on government debt equal 25% of government revenue.
There’s no way that Japan will ever repay this debt. It has two main options: either go through extraordinary pain by cutting back on government expenditure or print substantial money to inflate some of the debt away.
Japan is choosing the second option, as are most governments around the world. It would rather print money than cut spending and doom the economy to a substantial contraction. The choice to print money though will result in an even more painful and drawn-out outcome.
It’s inevitable that the yen will fall further from here, potentially much further. I’ve previously said that the yen at 200 or 300 on the dollar would not surprise. This could prove optimistic.
It also seems inevitable that Japanese interest rates will rise and bonds will sell off. Yields have to rise to just 2% for interest costs on government debt to take up 80% of government revenue. The jig will be up well before that though.
Those that argue this won’t happen as 91% of Japanese government bonds are held by domestic investors are missing some key points. Foreign ownership of bonds is rising as domestic investors need more money to fund their retirements (Japan’s rapidly ageing population). Foreigners will demand higher yields for the risks that they’re taking on. And even domestic investors aren’t going to sit by earning 0.6% on a 10-year bond as hyperinflation takes hold and the currency tanks.
Currency wars to begin in earnest
Talk of currency wars has been on the backburner for a few months. Expect that talk to heat up and become a reality as Japan ramps up stimulus in the next two weeks.
The likes of South Korea and Taiwan are already suffering from the sharp fall of the yen. They, and many others such as Germany and emerging countries, aren’t going to sit by and watch their exporters get priced out of the market by the Japanese. They’ll retaliate with currency depreciations of their own and the currency wars will be on in earnest. But the question is whether these countries will be able to keep up with a hyper-inflating Japan. I highly doubt it.
This post was originally published at Asia Confidential: http://asiaconf.com/

17 December, 2012

Crisis in Euroland: Year in Review

Author: Christopher Alessi, Online Editor/Writer
December 12, 2012

EU leaders took significant, if halting, steps in 2012 to rein in the ongoing eurozone debt crisis and facilitate greater European fiscal and political integration. The European Central Bank's announcement that it was prepared to buy an unlimited amount of government bonds on the secondary market was arguably the most aggressive measure taken this year. The move sent a strong signal to jittery markets that the EU would take any necessary actions to shore up the single currency area, while providing struggling sovereigns with the space to implement vital structural reforms. At the same time, the EU began to slowly lay the groundwork for new pan-European agreements and institutions--including a fiscal compact and banking union--that could make the EU and eurozone more durable, while staving of future crises. Still, many eurozone states face significant challenges in implementing the economic and labor reforms necessary to make their economies more competitive, while reducing their debt and deficit burdens.

A Second Bailout for Greece
Eurozone leaders agree in late February to a second bailout package for Greece worth $172 billion, including a 53 percent debt write-down by private bondholders. In exchange, Greece vows to implement further austerity measures to help tackle its mounting debt burden. The plan is designed to reduce Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio from 160 percent to 120.5 percent by 2020, but is deemed unrealistic by the middle of the year. Similarly, many policymakers and economists are skeptical that the second bailout will be sufficient, while others worry the attendant austerity measures will only plunge Greece further into recession.
EU Leaders Adopt a Fiscal Compact
In early March, leaders of twenty-five out of the twenty-seven EU countries (all but the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic) sign a new Fiscal Compact treaty mandating stricter budget discipline (BBC). The treaty must be ratified by twelve eurozone states to take effect. The compact was originally developed at an EU summit in December 2011 in an effort by European leaders to facilitate greater fiscal integration, amid mounting fears that the eurozone and wider EU could collapse. However, the treaty faces criticism (ProjectSyndicate) from some policymakers and economists for failing to address the economic plight of indebted eurozone states, while crystalizing a German-driven agenda of austerity amid a deepening eurozone recession.
France Rejects Sarkozy and Austerity
In May, French voters elect Socialist François Hollande (WSJ) as the new president of France, rejecting, at least rhetorically, Nicolas Sarkozy and his pro-austerity--and pro-German--approach to the eurozone crisis. Hollande vows to challenge German Chancellor Angela Merkel by shifting the policy discourse away from budget cuts and implementing a so-called growth pact. Nonetheless, Hollande is forced to adopt austerity policies and the fiscal compact, while conceding the significant economic challenges confronting France.
Greeks Vote to Stay in the Euro
Greece's center-right New Democracy party wins (CNN) the most votes in a second round of parliamentary elections in June. The victory ensures the country's commitment to EU bailout plans and austerity measures, and staves off a Greek exit from eurozone. The elections come on the heels of a first round of voting in May that yielded significant gains for fringe, anti-austerity parties, calling into question Greece's future in the single currency union. The vote is considered a public endorsement of Greece's EU membership, reassuring markets and political leaders of the country's commitment to the single currency.
Spain Requests Bank Bailout
In June, the Spanish government officially requests "up to a maximum" of $122 billion in EU funds to recapitalize its ailing banks (DerSpiegel) and provide a buffer of capital to prevent future crises. By September, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy implements a fresh round of austerity measures amid growing fears the country may need to request a full government bailout from the EU. Meanwhile, the EU approves $48 billion (WSJ) in funds for the Spanish bank rescue in late November. The move signals a widening of the eurozone crisis from one centered on sovereign debt to one with a banking crisis component.
EU Officials Propose a Banking Union
At the end of June, EU leaders introduce plans to create a so-called banking union that would provide a centralized regulatory framework for the eurozone's large banks. In July, EU officials move forward on plans for establishing a banking supervisor that would be situated in the European Central Bank (WSJ). The single EU banking authority would potentially be able to activate the permanent EU rescue fund in order to directly recapitalize struggling eurozone banks, such as those in Spain. The plan is the latest EU initiative to centralize control over eurozone finances while reducing the power of national governments, but raises questions about the role of the ECB and whether it is acquiring too much power without a democratic mandate. However, in mid-December, EU finance ministers officially agree to a deal to create a single banking supervisor (WSJ) within the ECB that will monitor at least one hundred and fifty of the eurozone's biggest banks and those in other EU countries that choose to participate, the first concrete step toward establishing a banking union.
ECB Unveils Unlimited Bond-Buying Plan
In late July, ECB President Mario Draghi vows that the central bank will "do whatever it takes to preserve the euro" (Bloomberg), sending markets higher and reducing borrowing costs for indebted sovereigns. Weeks later, Draghi announces a new and potentially unlimited program to buy government bonds of struggling eurozone states (Reuters) on the secondary market in order to bring down their borrowing costs and calm markets. Draghi says the plan will provide a "fully effective backstop to prevent potentially destructive scenarios," despite objections from the German central bank on grounds that the ECB is overstepping its monetary policy mandate and moving into the sphere of fiscal policy. The bank's actions also underscore concerns over an increasing democratic deficit (FT) in European policymaking.
German Court Supports Bailout Fund
Germany's constitutional court in September approves the establishment of the eurozone's €500 billion ($650 billion) permanent rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (FT), paving the way for it to be fully operational by the end of 2012. The ESM is inaugurated (DuetscheWelle) by eurozone finance ministers in early October in Brussels, amid a debate over exactly what role the fund will play in alleviating the continent's debt crisis. Activist groups in Germany had filed a lawsuit over the constitutionality of the bailout fund (DerSpiegel). While the challenge was overturned, the case crystalized both the frustration about the lack of democratic accountability at the European level and increasing public opposition to paying for the indebted eurozone periphery.
A Revised EU Aid Deal for Greece
In November, eurozone finance ministers and the International Monetary Fund agree to a revised aid deal for Greece (DerSpiegel), including lowering interest rates on Greek bailout loans and implementing a debt-buyback program. The new plan requires Greece to cut its debt-to-GDP ratio to 124 percent by 2020, rather than 120 percent, while committing to bring its debt levels "substantially below" 110 percent by 2022. The deal also allows for the release of the next tranche of bailout money (FT) for Greece in December, totaling around €34 billion.
Not Out of the Woods Yet
Despite the substantial steps taken by EU policymakers over the past year, many challenges lie ahead for the beleaguered monetary union. The Roubini Group's Megan Greene writes that, "While the most disastrous possible risk – a complete, disorderly disintegration of the eurozone – has been greatly reduced by the ECB's new bond-buying program … the worst of the eurozone crisis is by no means behind us." If the eurozone moves forward with further fiscal and political integration, it could marginalize countries in the EU that do not use the euro, creating a so-called two-tier Europe. At the same time, the United Kingdom continues to distance itself from the EU, which could ultimately result in a British exit and a complete rethinking of the union. More broadly, the eurozone's larger economies like Italy and Spain--and, perhaps, most notably France (Economist)--have substantial structural reforms to undertake to make their labor markets more flexible and economies more competitive in order to avoid being dragged further into the mire of sovereign debt that has consumed the periphery.
http://www.cfr.org/eu/crisis-euroland-year-review/p29648#cid=soc-twitter-at-analysis_brief-crisis_in_euroland_year_in_rev-121212
 

28 November, 2012

Golden Dawn - Greece


As Greece reels from more economic pain, this report reveals claims that the far-right Golden Dawn party have heavily infiltrated the police. It's a stark warning of where the country could be headed. "Blood! Honour! Golden Dawn!" Dressed all in black and in protective gear, members of Golden Dawn look more like soldiers than protesters. As Greek civil society has been crumbling under economic pressures, their savage attacks on the immigrants they blame for the economic crisis have become more frequent and violent. "They kicked my face. I had to have metal plates implanted," an Egyptian fisherman tells us. Even more shocking though are the links that have been drawn between them and the state. For the first time in this report a senior police officer has spoken on camera to claim that successive governments in Greece allowed the ultra-nationalist party to infiltrate the police force. "The state apparatus have known Golden Dawn's every move for years now... the state made room for the terrorists. It did that deliberately to use them for its own purposes," he insists. A frightening snapshot of a country in crisis.

26 October, 2012

The Crisis of Civilization


Like the book on which it is based, the film consists of seven parts which explore the interconnected dynamic of global crises of Climate Catastrophe; Peak Energy; Peak Food; Economic Instability; International Terrorism; and the Militarization Tendency -- with a final section on The Post-Peak World.

19 January, 2012

Seminārs/konference "KRĪZE.PĀRMAIŅAS.JAUNAS IESPĒJAS 2012".


Krīze.Pārmaiņas.Jaunas iespējas 2012 from createris.com on Vimeo.


CREATERIS.COM uzaicina apmeklēt semināru / konferenci "KRĪZE.PĀRMAIŅAS.JAUNAS IESPĒJAS 2012", kas norisināsies 2012 gada 15 martā, Rīgā, MULTIKINO Riga Plaza. Pilna informācija par semin;aru pieejama www.createris.com.

Analītiķis: ir četri galvenie scenāriji, kā pasaules valstis izkļūs no krīzes

Straujš aizņēmumu līdzekļu pieaugums finanšu ekonomiskajā sistēmā ir viena no raksturīgākajām mūsdienu kapitālisma īpašībām. Šodien ar aizņēmuma līdzekļiem tiek iegādāti vairums finanšu aktīvi. Vienkārši matemātiski aprēķini rāda, ka dzēst parādus tikai ar ieņēmumiem, kuri ir tikai daļa no iekšzemes kopprodukta, praktiski nav iespējams, stāsta ABLV grupas galvenais analītiķis, matemātikas doktors Leonīds Aļšanskis, minot arī četurs iespējamos scenārijus, lai nepieļautu pasaules valstu ieslīgšanu «pilna mēroga parādu krīzē».

Praktiski šodien ar aizņēmuma līdzekļiem tiek iegādāti vairums finanšu aktīvi. Aktīvas aizņēmējas kļuvušas arī valstis, kuras ar kreditoru naudu sedz savu budžetu deficītus. Tieši attīstīto valstu valsts parādu straujais pieaugums ir izveidojis parādu problēmu par pašu bīstamāko pasaules finanšu-ekonomiskajai sistēmai.
Precīzi uzskaitīt parādus, kurus uzkrājuši visi Zemes iedzīvotāji, ir ārkārtīgi sarežģīti. Pēc dažiem aprēķiniem, to kopējā summa mērāma simtos triljonu dolāru un vairākkārtīgi pārsniedz pasaules IKP apmēru Skaidrs, ka nodzēst šādus parādus ar ieņēmumiem, kuri ir tikai daļa no jauna izveidojamā IKP, ir ārkārtīgi sarežģīti, skaidro matemātikas doktors. 

L. Aļšanskis norāda, ka finanšu sistēma joprojām ir stabila, jo lielākā daļa aizņēmēju labprātīgi apkalpo parādu, tas ir, maksā procentus. Atbilstoši, sistēma ļauj tiem pagarināt (refinansēt) parādus un pat palielināto to apjomus. Praktiski ātrie parādi šodien daļēji pārvēršas beztermiņa parādos, pārejot no aizņēmuma kapitāla formas uz kvazisubordinētā kapitāla formu.
Lai arī sistēmu periodiski satricina parādu krīzes, kas noslēdzas ar defoltiem (pat ar lieliem, kā Krievijā 1998. gadā, Argentīnā 2001. gadā vai General Motors 2009. gadā), tie sistēmu būtiski neizjauc, viņš norāda, piebilstot, ka trauksmes zvani ieskanējās 2007. gadā, kad «otršķirīgajā amerikāņu hipotēkas sektora krīze pārauga spēcīgā vispasaules finanšu krīzē». «Apturēt 2008. - 2009. gada katastrofu izdevās tikai pateicoties tam, ka iejaucās vadošās pasaules valstis (gan politiski, gan monetāri), iepludinot tirgos triljonus dolāru un eiro,» viņš uzsver.
Viens no blakus efektiem cīņā ar krīzi un tās sekām bija attīstīto valstu deficītu un valsts parādu straujš pieaugums. Lai arī vairums valstu atļāvās dzīvot pāri saviem līdzekļiem arī agrāk, tik strauju valstu aizņēmumu līmeņu pieaugumu pasaule vēl nebija redzējusi. Tādēļ tieši attīstīto valstu parādi, kuri vēl nesen tika uzskatīti par visdrošākajiem aktīviem, šodien ir kļuvuši par galveno destabilizācijas faktoru sistēmā, skaidro eksperts.

«Attīstīto valstu šodien uzkrāto valsts parādu apjoms mērāms desmitos triljonu dolāru, bet dažām valstīm tas jau pārsniedz gada IKP. Turklāt laikā, kad Māstrihtas kritērijos «likumiski» noteiktā sliekšņa - 60% no IKP pārsniegšana tiek uzskatīta par bīstamu ekonomikai,» stāsta ABLV grupas galvenais analītiķis.
Parādu krīze iestājas tad, kad lielākie parādi saskaras ar augstām procentu izmaksām. Matemātikas doktors to izteicis formulā: Parādu krīze = liels parāds + augstas refinansēšanās likmes tirgū.
Tieši strauji pieaugošo procentu izmaksu apmēru samazināšanai, Grieķijas, Īrijas un Portugāles tirgus refinansēšanās tika aizvietota ar «ne tirgus palīdzību». Bet problēma ir tajā, ka «spēcīgajām» eirozonas valstīm, kuras organizē palīdzību «vājajām» valstīm, nav līdzekļu, jo tās pašas ir iegrimušas parādos. Tas nozīmē, ka palīdzības sniegšanai tās pašas aizņemas naudu tirgū. Nav pārliecības, ka kādā brīdī tirgus nesāk «uzskrūvēt» aizņēmuma līdzekļu cenas arī šīm valstīm, kas ierautu krīzē arvien vairāk un vairāk – skaidro L. Aļšanskis.
Viņš norāda – šodien dzīvībai būtiski ir nepieļaut lielo pasaules valstu ieslīgšanu parādu krīzē. Viņš min arī četrus variantus, lai no esošās ekonomiskās situācijas izkļūtu sveikā bez ieslīgšanas pilna mēroga parādu krīzē.

1. Teorētiski parādu slodze var samazināties, ja ilglaicīgi un ar augstiem rādītājiem pieaugtu reālais IKP. Šādā gadījumā pieaugtu arī nominālais IKP, kas samazinātu attiecināmā parāda apjomu. Bet valstu budžetu ieņēmumu pieaugums var novest pie bezdeficīta, kas ļaus samazināt parāda absolūto apmēru. Tā ir vislabākā izeja emitentiem un valsts parādu turētajiem. Tomēr šodien vadošās attīstītās valstis ir zaudējušas savu pasaules ekonomiskā pieauguma lokomotīvju lomu un ir ārkārtīgi maza iespējamība tam, ka šo valstu IKP stabili pieaugs ar augstiem rādītājiem.
2. Nominālā IKP augsts pieaugums, bet nepieaug reālais IKP – augstas inflācijas dēļ. Šādā situācijā absolūtais parāds nekrīt, bet tā attiecība pret IKP samazinās, atvieglojot parādu slogu. Šī izeja pilnībā apmierinātu emitentus. Bet tā ir ārkārtīgi nevēlama parādu turētājiem, jo tā samazina viņu aktīvu vērtību un tas praktiski ir vienlīdzīgs ar daļēju defoltu. Turklāt augsta inflācija sevī slēpj nopietnus ekonomiskās stabilitātes un nacionālo valūtu riskus. Tādēļ vadošās pasaules centrālās bankas (kuras spēj ietekmēt inflācijas procesus) pagaidām krasi iestājas pret augsta inflācijas līmeņa pieļaušanas.
3. Daļēju un kontrolējamu defoltu veikšana – variants, kurš šobrīd tiek izmēģināts Grieķijā. Atšķirībā no pakāpeniskas aktīvu vērtības samazināšanas inflācijas ietekmē, šis variants piedāvā vienreizēju un strauju aktīvu norakstīšanu. Par līdzīgu pasākumu var uzskatīt strauju tās valūtas devalvāciju, kurā nominēti parādi (bet mūsdienu Jamaikas valūtas sistēmā vadošajām valūtām nav vienreizējas devalvācijas mehānisma). Daļējs defolts pilnībā apmierinātu emitentus. Tomēr tas ir īpaši smags variants aktīvu turētājiem. Turklāt tas ir īpaši bīstams visai finanšu sistēmas stabilitātei, ja tas tik tiešām izraisīs liela mēroga zaudējumus. Lielu parādu emitentu gadījumā, tādu kā Itālija, Amerika vai Japāna, zaudējumi būs kolosāli. Lai gan šeit ir iespējama «radoša» pieeja. Piemēram, norakstīšanu var veikt periodiski nelielās porcijās, pietuvinot rezultātu vērtības zaudēšanai inflācijas ietekmē. Tomēr, diezin vai šim variantam izdosies saņemt parādu turētāju piekrišanu (bez viņiem nav iespējams normāls refinansēšanās process sistēmā).
4. Esošā status quo saglabāšana un nepieļaut ieslīgšanu parādu krīzē, uzturot zemas likmes tirgū. Praktiski tā ir situācija, kurā jau vairākas desmitgades atrodas Japāna. Bet situācijā ar Japānas parādiem ir sava specifika. Praktiski viss japāņu parāds (vairāk kā 95%) atrodas rezidentu rokās, tai skaitā lielu banku un pensiju fondu rokās. Ņemot vērā japāņu sadarbības modeli starp valsti un biznesu, šie vērtspapīru turētāji nesāks «pelnīt» uz ienesīguma palielināšanu tirgū. Pēc būtības, šajā situācijā tiek īstenots nerakstīts līgums starp parāda turētājiem un emitentu. Pirmie nedestabilizē situāciju, bet otrs garantē procentu izmaksu «līdz bezgalībai».

http://www.db.lv/finanses/makroekonomika/analitikis-ir-cetri-galvenie-scenariji-ka-pasaules-valstis-izklus-no-krizes-251007

05 December, 2011

....CASH IS THE POWER

Because of the today's situation with banks and financial institution, my suggestion is to find out the way HOW TO TURN BACK TO THE REAL CASH....


The Cash is the Power....

Rimšēvičs: neņemiet kredītus; krīzes otrais vilnis ir klāt

Es domāju, ka otrais krīzes vilnis ir sācies, tas šobrīd ir redzams ar neapbruņotu aci. Ja mēs paraugāmies uz gada sākuma prognozēm par to, kā attīstīsies pasaules ekonomika, mēs skaidri redzam lejupslīdi, vadošo valstu ražošanas apjomi, indeksi iet uz leju. Arī nākamā gada prognozes ir ļoti piesardzīgas un pesimistiskas, tā laikrakstam "Diena" izteicies Latvijas Bankas vadītājs Ilmārs Rimšēvičs.

Kredītus tagad ņemt nevajadzētu
Vai uzņemties kredītsaistības situācijā, ja šodien kādam cilvēkam ir nodoms aizņemties, piemēram, dzīvokļa iegādei, un cilvēks ir sarēķinājis, ka šo kredītu var atdot ar to ienākumu līmeni, kāds patlaban viņam ir, rēķinoties, ka viņa ienākumi saglabāsies? Sestdien laikrakstā "Diena" publicētā intervijā Latvijas Bankas (LB) vadītājs Ilmārs Rimšēvičs šobrīd iesaka kredītu neņemt.
"Mana rekomendācija - šobrīd šo kredītu neņemt!" intervijā laikrakstam norādījis LB  vadītājs. Viņš ir pārliecināts, ka otrais krīzes vilnis ir sācies.

Ir sācies otrais vilnis
Atbildot uz jautājumu, kāpēc neizdevās izbēgt no otrā krīzes viļņa, viņš laikrakstam norāda: "Valstu valdības pagājušajos 10 gados ir dzīvojušas pāri saviem līdzekļiem. (..) Visa pasaule nedzīvo pāri saviem līdzekļiem. Puse pasaules dzīvo pāri saviem līdzekļiem, puse pasaules ir tā, kas aizdod un uztur šo dzīvošanu pāri saviem līdzekļiem.

Rietumi dzīvo uz Austrumu rēķina
Kā galvenos aizdevējus LB vadītājs min ķīniešus, japāņus, taivāniešus un indonēziešus un, viņaprāt, Rietumu civilizācija pašlaik dzīvo uz Austrumu un Latīņamerikas valstu rēķina.
Rimšēvičs intervijā laikrakstam pauž viedokli, ka šobrīd Eiropa sadalījusies divās daļās un lielākās problēmas nav saistītas ar pašu eiro, bet gan ar "atsevišķu valstu spēju apkalpot savus parādus".
LB vadītājs tāpat norāda, ka, viņaprāt, eirozona izdzīvos. "Nav, protams, izslēgts, ka beigu beigās kāda no valstīm izstāsies vai eleganti, ar kādu juridisku konstrukciju, kas šobrīd tiek intensīvi meklēta (..), tiks eleganti izvadīta no eirozonas. Kas attiecas par baumām, ka nākotnē eirozona varētu būt citā sastāvā, es domāju, tas jāuztver pietiekami nopietni. Vairāki Eiropas vadošie ekonomisti un politiķi ir sapratuši, ka nepieciešama nopietna pāreksaminācija, jo vairāku valstu valdības nav gatavas pārredzamā nākotnē sakārtot savu fiskālo situāciju. Tas mums būtu jāpatur prātā - tajā brīdī, kad notiek dalīšanās, kurā vietā ir Latvija. Vai ārpus tā visa, vai Latvija ir iekšā un paliek tajā stiprajā daļā," viņš sacījis.

Uz jautājumu, ar ko valdībai jāsilda ekonomika, viņš atbildējis, ka "galvenie stimulētāji un attīstītāji ir komercbankas". "Ir tirgus, kuram ir līdzekļi. Šobrīd Eiropā naudas pietiek, bet bankas sēž uz naudas, tās to tur vai nu Eiropas Centrālajā bankā, vai citās komercbankās un vienkārši to neaizdod," teicis Rimšēvičs.

TVNET/Diena
 

Eksperts: Otrais krīzes vilnis uzņem augstumu

Otrais krīzes vilnis, kas ir sācies Eiropā, patlaban uzņem augstumu, un jautājums ir - cik lielus gruvešus tas aiz sevis atstās, stāstīja "Citadele Asset Management" valdes loceklis Zigurds Vaikulis.

Gads nebūs viegls
Eksperts prognozēja, ka nākamais gads pasaulē nebūs viegls, kā arī Eiropa ar savām problēmām var "paraut līdzi" pārējo pasauli. "Tas pats notika 2008.gadā, kad bija ASV mājokļu tirgus krīzīte, bet tā pārauga haosā," sacīja ekonomists.

Problēmas būs visiem
Arī pārāk lielie valstu parādi ne par ko labu neliecina. Pēc Vaikuļa domām, problēmas nākamgad būs visiem, turklāt diezgan pamatīgas. Arī cilvēkiem, kas nodarbojas ar akciju pirkšanu un pārdošanu, ir jābūt uzmanīgiem.

"Skaidrā nauda arī nav slikta ideja. Ja 3-4 mēnešu laikā tirgū nobrūk cenas, skaidrā nauda sniegs iespēju nopirkt kaut ko lēti," uzsvēra Vaikulis.

"Citadele Asset Management" valdes loceklis Zigurds Vaikulis